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Abstract: Since the Global Financial Crisis that started in 2008, the term “ordoliberal-
ism” has experienced a marked revival. Academics and politicians of all couleurs have 
recently referred to ordoliberalism as a possible way forward. Others have held ordolib-
eralism responsible for Germany’s intransigent stance in the Euro rescue. However, 
most references use ordoliberalism merely as a shorthand for “liberalism with the state” 
or anti-inflationary macro-economic policy. Few have attempted to get at the heart of 
the ordoliberal theory of market regulation. This paper seeks to clarify the ordoliberal 
position in order to revisit current references to this theory. We argue that the ordoliber-
al distinction between market conforming and non-conforming state intervention holds 
some lessons for current debates about economic regulation. In particular, we focus on 
the Financial Crisis from an ordoliberal perspective and assess its relevance in the cur-
rent context and its implications for regulatory reform. 
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Introduction 
 
Niall Ferguson and Sarah Wagenknecht are certainly strange bedfellows. The political 
stance of the British-born Harvard professor Niall Ferguson can best be described as 
neo-conservative, having been a consultant for the US Republican Party and a contrib-
uting editor for the Sunday Telegraph and the Financial Times. Sarah Wagenknecht, by 
contrast, is a Member of the German Parliament for the Left Party (Linkspartei), usually 
adopting a neo-communist point of view, as illustrated by her long-term membership in 
a communist sub-committee of the Left Party (Kommunistische Plattform). 
What they have in common, is that both have recently been seduced by ordoliberal-
ism. At a meeting of the pro-market Mont Pèlerin Society, Ferguson suggested to redis-
cover the ordoliberal idea of an effective order of competition “before Keynesian econ-
omists will succeed to turn the wheel of history backwards” (cited in Plehwe 2010, 13). 
Wagenknecht, in turn, employs the concept of ordoliberalism in order to criticise the 
laisser faire approach of modern capitalism holding the latter responsible for the current 
financial crisis. In her book “Freedom, not Capitalism” (Freiheit statt Kapitalismus, 
Wagenknecht 2011) she praises ordoliberalism for reconciling the market economy with 
the public interest and for limiting the power of big corporations. In her view this 
should be the basis for a new type of socialism (what she calls kreativer Sozialismus): a 
market economy without capitalism and socialism without a planned economy. 
Thus, both sides – Left and Right – seem to regard ordoliberalism as a way forward. 
The apparent reason is that even moderate conservatives, such as Richard Posner now 
believe that some brands of economic liberalism may have gone too far in their rejection 
of the state (see Posner 2009, 236: “laissez faire capitalism failed us”). Beyond such 
normative claims this debate can be related to some contemporary features of state ac-
tivity, notably regulation. Libertarian understandings of the economy that conceptual-
ised markets as the result of “depolitisation”, i.e. they emerge naturally once the state is 
“rolled back”, are challenged by Vogel’s (1996) well-known observation that neo-
liberal policies often had the seemingly paradoxical effect of increasing rather than re-
ducing regulatory density: in other words, freer markets often require more rules. The 
term “regulatory capitalism” was coined to describe this new situation (Braithwaite 
2008). This has led authors in the field of regulation studies to conclude that deregula-
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tion was a “revolution that wasn’t” (Levi-Faur 2006, 506), and others have even confi-
dently affirmed that “Regulatory Capitalism is not about neoliberalism, indeed […] 
those who think we are in an era of neoliberalism are mistaken” (Braithwaite 2005, iv). 
In this paper, we show that both views reveal a somewhat superficial understanding 
of the role of the state. Ordoliberalism is often invoked in order to promote an economic 
order that maintains liberal traits, but leaves room for state intervention. Yet, the 
ordoliberal theory of state intervention is more sophisticated than most references to it 
suggest. Indeed, the above-mentioned views are largely based on a rhetorical, even a 
rather naïve, use of the concept of ordoliberalism, essentially equating it with “liberal-
ism plus the state”, with Ferguson emphasising the “liberalism” aspect and 
Wagenknecht emphasising the “state” one. Yet, we argue that the renewed interest in 
ordoliberalism has the benefit of allowing once again a more thoughtful debate about 
the relationship between liberalism, state activity and economic regulation. While the 
ordoliberal conception does not necessarily suggest a solution to the current problems in 
the short run, in the long run ordoliberalism may form the basis for a sounder concep-
tion of state regulation in the economy than more libertarian views can offer. 
In so doing, the paper aspires to contribute to the discussion about “the contours of 
the post-crisis governing agenda” (Froud et al. 2012, 35), notably the question: “(i)f the 
old orthodoxy has been shaken, what is likely to replace it?” (Coen and Roberts 2012, 
7). While it is not possible to investigate whether an ordoliberal regulatory regime 
would have allowed it to prevent the Global Financial Crisis (in the following: GFC), 
clarifying its main theoretical claims and intellectual precepts constitutes a first step to-
wards formulating alternative understandings of the relationship between state regula-
tion and the economy. 
The paper is structured as follows. The first main part explains the central ideas of 
ordoliberalism, as developed in Germany in the first half of the 20th century. We also 
provide examples of how these ideas have had a practical impact in areas such as Euro-
pean competition policy. The second main part analyses how an ordoliberal position 
assesses the causes of the current economic turmoil and possible responses. In particu-
lar, it is shown that ordoliberalism does not only suggest a need for regulation but also 
provides some guidance on its substance. It therefore has distinct normative and sub-
stantive features that make it of potential interest today. 
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Ordoliberalism: theory and practice 
 
Re-visiting the ordoliberal case for regulation requires an understanding of its intellec-
tual foundations. This section sketches the central ideas of ordoliberalism1 and explains 
its practical relevance in Europe. 
 
The central ideas of ordoliberalism 
 
The term “ordoliberalism” was first used in a 1950 issue of the review ORDO. Yet, in 
substance, ordoliberalism already emerged in Germany during the interwar period. The 
founding fathers were the economist Walter Eucken and the lawyers Franz Böhm and 
Hans Grossmann-Doerth, all three from the University of Freiburg (thus, also “Freiburg 
School of Law and Economics”, Vanberg 1998). Subsequently, academics from other 
universities have also contributed to ordoliberal ideas, the main voices having been 
Wilhelm Röpke, Alfred Müller-Armack and Alexander Rüstow.2 
Ordoliberalism was at the beginning closely related to a broader international move-
ment for a new liberalism that first met at the foundational Colloquium Walter Lipp-
mann in Paris in 1938. The fundamental novelty of the liberalism presented by Walter 
Lippmann, whose book “The Good Society” (Lippmann 2005 [1937]) formed the basis 
for the gathering, compared to classical liberalism is the focus on the market mechanism 
and the competition principle as the sole ordering principle of economic exchanges. 
Moreover, it defended the view that markets are not natural givens, but require state in-
tervention to function. 
Scholars of the Chicago School maintained the first statement, but moved away from 
the second (Mirowski and Plehwe 2009). By contrast, the core issue for ordoliberalism 
lies in the need for adequate state intervention in favour of functioning markets. Draw-
ing on the concept of “ordo”, the Latin word for “order”, ordoliberalism refers to an 
ideal economic system that would be more orderly than the laisser faire economy advo-
cated by classical liberals (Oliver 1960, 133-34). A positive role of the state is seen as 
crucial in order to create the conditions for a liberal economy. Without a strong gov-
ernment, ordoliberals argued, power differences among private interests would under-
mine the functioning of markets (Oliver 1960; Boarman 1964; Gerber 1994).  
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This assessment was based on the experience of the Weimar Republic (1919-1933) 
during which ordoliberalism emerged. The weakness of the Weimar democracy and its 
perceived permeability to interest group influence and party politics led early ordoliber-
als to lean towards a preference for strong government in order to strike an appropriate 
balance between private and public power (Peck 2010, 59). Röpke, for instance, men-
tions the example of the Swedish industrialist Ivar Kreuger, also known as the “Match 
King”, who during the interwar years obtained monopoly privileges over match manu-
facturing in several countries including Weimar Germany in exchange for his taking 
over national debt. This implied that the private monopoly resulted in this instance, like 
in most others, from a weak state who indulges in policies that are incompatible with 
markets not from a natural tendency of markets towards monopolies (Röpke 1950, 230). 
Yet, for ordoliberals markets were not any more natural than monopolies. Rather 
than emerging spontaneously, markets had to be created and maintained by state inter-
vention and regulation. Thus, Röpke (1950, 228) stated that “[t]he freedom of the mar-
ket in particular necessitates a very watchful and active economic policy which at the 
same time must also be fully aware of its goal and the resulting limits to its activity, so 
that it does not transgress the boundaries which characterize a compatible form of inter-
ventionism” (our translation). It is this active and interventionist state that has some-
times been referred to as “positive liberalism” and “interventionist liberalism” (cf. Fou-
cault 2004, 138), and it is this rejection of “laisser faire, laisser passer”, which charac-
terises not just ordoliberalism, but was also the defining element of the ideas presented 
at the Colloquium Walter Lippmann in 1938 (cf. Röpke 1942; Böhm 1937; Miksch 
1949). After the Second World War the Chicago School evolved into a fundamentally 
different direction, which explains the difficulty to understand the above-mentioned re-
regulation trend of the 1990s. For ordoliberals, the statement “freer markets, more 
rules” would appear perfectly natural. Leonhard Miksch (1949, 327), for instance, sup-
ported regulation “[e]ven if the number of corrective interventions that seem necessary 
turned out to be so large that […] there was no quantitative difference anymore with 
what ‘planners’ would wish for […]” (quoted in Foucault 2004: 158, fn. 19; our transla-
tion).3 
State intervention hence very much constitutes one of the core claims of ordoliberal-
ism. The difference with socialist planning was not in terms of quantity of regulation or 
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state intervention, but in its nature. The goal was not to weaken the state, but to direct 
its intervention into the “right”, i.e. market conforming, direction. Indeed, ordoliberals 
developed a theory of “conform intervention” and “non-conform intervention”. The 
former, is state intervention that does not hamper three fundamental market forces, 
which are according to Franz Böhm a tendency to reducing costs, a tendency to reduce 
profits in the long run, and a tendency to increase profits in the short run through cost 
reductions and increases in productivity (Foucault 2004, 160, fn. 38). The notion of 
“conform actions” is further developed by Röpke (1950) and Eucken (1952). Francois 
Bilger (1964) also distinguishes between “regulatory” (actions régulatrices) and “or-
donnating” state actions (actions ordonnatrices). Regulatory actions intervened more 
directly on market mechanisms and should hence be limited to the goal of price stabil-
ity, while ordonnating actions aim at creating the pre-conditions for competition and 
functioning markets. These actions intervene on the “frame” for market activity and 
should hence be vigorous and extensive. 
The ordoliberal theory of “conform intervention” applies to competition policy as 
one of the main ordoliberal concerns. Ordoliberals believe that the freedom of individu-
als to compete in markets should be separated from laisser faire, the freedom of markets 
from government intervention. Thus, they favoured a rigorous competition law, but also 
state intervention in order to “de-concentrate” economic power when a market becomes 
dominated by one or a few large players. In Eucken’s view, market and competition can 
only exist if a strong state establishes an economic order. The state’s role must be clear-
ly delimited; but in the area where the state has a role to play, it needs to be powerful 
and active in order to create a functioning and humane economic order (Goldschmidt 
and Rauchenschwandtner 2007; Eucken 1932; Rüstow 1953 and 1957). Also Röpke 
(1923), at the very beginning of the ordoliberal school of thought, defined the aim of 
ordoliberals as fighting for “the idea of the state and against the lack of freedom in 
which private economic monopolies – supported by government leading a shadow ex-
istence – keep the economy captive” (quoted in Megay 1970, 425). 
Ordoliberalism also stands for a view of the economy, which stressed the need for a 
market economy to be embedded in a functioning society and the fact that the “market 
economy constitutes a narrow sector of societal life only” (Röpke 1946, 82-3; cf. Peck 
2010, 61). Eucken (1932) used the concept of “interdependence of orders” in order to 
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underscore that the economic order is interdependent with all other governmental, socie-
tal and cultural orders in a society. As a consequence, ordoliberals also cared about so-
cial issues, though they did not support the provision of universal welfare (Ptak 2009). 
Peck (2010, 58) even calls this pragmatic and outcome-orientated approach the “first 
third way”, although others object that “[o]rdoliberalism is not a ‘third way’ between 
capitalism and socialism; it should be seen as a different form of liberalism” (Vatiero 
2010, 706). 
More precisely, some ordoliberals such as Alfred Müller-Armack and Alexander 
Rüstow (1957) have shown sympathy for the idea of social policy and the welfare state 
as long as it was market-conforming. They rejected “purely material” social policies and 
developed instead the concept of “Vitalpolitik”, which should aim at improving people’s 
living standards and wellbeing not just through cash transfers, but by including a trans-
formative structural societal policy (strukturelle Gesellschaftspolitik). Contrary to so-
cialist ideas, these policies were not aimed at a social egalitarianism, but rather at stabi-
lising a supposed “natural order” of society where different social strata co-existed. 
Thus, ordoliberals supported individual mobility with the state being responsible for 
providing equal opportunities; yet, they did not follow a progressive approach to social 
questions – something which Wagenknecht (2011) seems to overlook. 
One of the main reasons why ordoliberals would object to the socialist type of wel-
fare spending is related to the importance that is given to the concepts of personal re-
sponsibility and liability. This is notably expressed in the principle of liability (Haftung-
sprinzip). This principle states that those who benefit from a particular action also have 
to be liable if things go wrong (e.g., Pies and Sass 2012). By contrast, generous univer-
sal welfare transfers are seen as creating negative incentives, reduce personal responsi-
bility and lead to moral-hazard. 
The concern for interdependencies between different spheres of society led ordolib-
erals also to be open to more interdisciplinary approaches than marginalist economics. 
Röpke explicitly argued for an anthropological-sociological approach to markets and the 
economy in order to achieve a truly socially-embedded market economy (Peck 2010, 
61). Market forces were not seen as universal, absolute principles, but as forces that had 
to be confined within a given economic order. According to Röpke (1950, 181):  
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“[w]e must stress most emphatically that we have no intention to demand more 
from competition than it can give. It is a means of establishing order and exercising 
control in the narrow sphere of a market economy based on the division of labour, 
but no principle on which a whole society can be built. From the sociological and 
moral point of view it is even dangerous because it tends more to dissolve than to 
unite. If competition is not to have the effect of a social explosive and is at the same 
time not to degenerate, its premise will be a correspondingly sound political and 
moral framework. There should be a strong state, aloof from the hungry hordes of 
vested interests, a high standard of business ethics, and un-degenerated community 
of people ready to co-operate with each other, who have a natural attachment to, 
and a firm place in society”. (our translation) 
 
Some US academics based in Chicago at first shared many assumptions and theories 
of the ordoliberals. For example, like ordoliberals, Henry Simons, professor at Chicago, 
took the view that the monopoly in all its forms, including large corporations, is “the 
great enemy of democracy” (Van Horn 2009, 204, 209). But after the Second World 
War the relationship between ordoliberalism and the Chicago School, now mainly iden-
tified with Milton Friedman and Aaron Director, became a more complicated one. There 
was some agreement and interaction. Both streams of thought did not support a social-
democratic welfare state, and both were sceptical of the influence of interests groups on 
politics. They also communicated and exchanged ideas on a regular basis in the Mont 
Pèlerin Society, founded by Friedrich von Hayek in 1947 (for details see Mirowski and 
Plehwe 2009). However, the Chicago School also increasingly diverged from its 
ordoliberal counterpart as it has increasingly embraced an optimistic view of the play of 
markets and an increasing suspiciousness of regulation to correct market failures (see 
Van Horn and Mirowski 2009). 
 
The practical relevance of ordoliberalism in Europe until the GFC 
 
Scholars agree that ordoliberalism achieved some practical relevance in Germany after 
the Second World War. A notable source of influence was Ludwig Erhard, the German 
Minister of Economics and an open supporter of ordoliberal ideas. This is not to say that 
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external events may not also have steered some policies in a different direction: for ex-
ample, the Korean War of the early 1950s and the corresponding recession are said to 
have fostered corporatism and social welfare policies in Germany (Joerges 2013, 5). 
Still, ordoliberalism did play an important role in Germany notably by contributing 
to a massive exercise of “state building” after the fall of the Nazi dictatorship. It was 
necessary to establish new state institutions, which would draw their legitimacy on the 
guarantee of individual political and economic liberty (Lemke 2001; Foucault 2004). 
This contrasts with US neoliberals for whom the welfare state, which was expanding 
with Roosevelt’s New Deal, became increasingly the main adversary. The fear of “col-
lectivism” and “socialism” was further spurred by the Cold War and the international 
spread of communism. Thus, while the task of re-building a functioning state prevented 
the German politics from adopting anti-state views, in the US collectivism and the state 
were frequently seen as the main enemy of a liberal society.  
More specifically, in Germany the active competition policy is one of the areas 
where the ordoliberal influence is clearest. Franz Böhm’s views on this issue strongly 
influenced the elaboration of the first German Competition Act after the Second World 
War (see Siems 2004, 37; cf. also Quack and Djelic 2005). The German position differs 
from the US one, as the former does not only ban cartels and syndicates but also aims 
for a de-concentration of the industry (see Berghahn and Young 2012, 4-5). By contrast, 
in the US, “big business” was frequently accepted as a legitimate form of economic or-
ganisation, in line with suggestions by the Chicago School that private monopoly power 
was merely a transitory phenomenon, which will ultimately be eroded by market forces 
(Director 1951; Friedman 1951; Director and Levi 1956; cf. also Van Horn 2011). 
It is often said that ordoliberalism has also been influential in the European Econom-
ic Community (EEC, now EU). In particular, ordoliberal ideas are said to have had a 
strong impact on EU competition policy (e.g., Willks 2005). Yet, this has been chal-
lenged by research showing that the European law-maker did not aim at a general pro-
hibition of market power (as ordoliberals would), but only if such power was seen as 
inefficient (Akman 2012). It has also been suggested that ordoliberal ideas were modi-
fied later on, as European competition law turned its attention to anti-competitive state 
activities and regulatory practices (Joerges 2013, 7-8).  
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A mixed picture also emerges more generally. Some scholars argue that the EU’s 
economic, social, fiscal and monetary policies are distinctly ordoliberal. According to 
Joerges (2010 and 2013) this can be seen in the fact that the EU (EEC/EC) was and still 
is mainly about establishing a non-political economic constitution with social policies 
being left to the Member States. Similarly, according to Petit (2012) and Bordes and 
Clerc (forthcoming) the Common Market and the Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU) are seen as narrowly prioritising stability with low debt and inflation levels over 
growth and employment – with the growth-element of the EU Stability and Growth Pact 
of 1997 only seen as a diplomatic concession (similar Luckhurst 2012, 749; see also 
Alesina et al. 2005, for the shifting policy focus of the EU). 
However, it is debatable whether these policies are all “ordoliberal”. Indeed, we 
should remember that some ordoliberals were from the outset very critical of the Euro-
pean project. For example, Röpke (1959), while in principle favourable to a European 
integration, strongly criticised most actual policies relating to the European Community 
and the project of the “common market” as “international collectivism.” He argued in-
stead for a minimally regulated economic area based on free-trade and the free convert-
ibility of currencies (cf. Feld 2012).  
It is also misleading to attribute everything based on a German design to ordoliberal-
ism. In a number of articles, Bibow (2009, 2012) has shown that ordoliberals such as 
Eucken would disapprove how the Euro and the European Central Bank (ECB) have 
been designed. Bibow also explains that Eucken rejected the notion of an independent 
central bank that has discretion in setting interest rates, which contrasts with the subse-
quent design of the ECB. 
In sum, there is some confusion about what policies are indeed ordoliberal. Central 
bank independence is not part of an ordoliberal agenda, notably due to its suspicious-
ness of discretionary politics and its preference for “market conforming” state actions. 
But ordoliberalism also favours a strong not a weak state, and it does not reject all types 
of social policies, as opposed to more radical libertarian views. Therefore, some aspects 
of the EU can certainly be seen as ordoliberal, but others are more closely related to an 
Anglo-Saxon understanding of liberalism. This modified positioning of ordoliberalism 
will also be apparent in the next section, dealing specifically with the Global Financial 
Crisis that started in 2008. 
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Ordoliberalism in the context of the financial crisis 
 
Many of the ordoliberal works were written in the 1930s, in the wake of the Great Crash 
of 1929 and several have indeed the crisis as their main theme (cf. Röpke 1950). There-
fore, it should come as no surprise that the current crisis has also stimulated interest in a 
form of liberalism that promotes a more ordered economy. In the 1930s, ordoliberalism 
did not impact on the policy responses to the Great Depression and most governments 
quickly turned to protectionism and Keynesian policies. The current political situation 
however is such that liberal solutions to the GFC may be the only politically feasible 
ones (Schmidt and Thatcher 2013). This may in part explain the regained appeal of 
ordoliberalism for many actors. Following the chronology of the crisis this section as-
sesses the immediate responses to the bank failures, reforms of financial regulation and 
corporate governance, and the Eurozone crisis. Thus, we aim to re-visit the ordoliberal 
position, while we do not claim that all of these responses are unique to ordoliberalism 
nor that they are indeed the optimal ones. 
 
Immediate responses to the bank failures 
 
In the early phase of the crisis the governments of different countries felt the need to 
bail-out major financial institutions (though, initially, Lehman Brothers was allowed to 
fail). The apparent reason was that some institutions may be “too big to fail” (TBTF). 
Thus, bail-outs were seen as unavoidable in order to prevent a collapse of the financial 
system as a whole. 
An ordoliberal response to this issue may, on the one hand, be self-righteous about 
the TBTF problem. One of the core claims of ordoliberalism is that markets have to be 
regulated in order to minimise market power. Thus, in a perfect ordoliberal world mar-
ket domination and the problem that some firms cannot be allowed to fail because they 
are “too big”, would not arise – while it may also be objected that the financial crisis 
has shown that it is not only the size of a firm that matters but also whether it may be 
“too interconnected to fail” (Roubini and Mihm 2010, 200).  
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On the other hand, ordoliberals would be sceptical of bail-outs. Ordoliberals approve 
state regulation but not “experimental economic policy” (Eucken 1952, 311) or discre-
tionary government intervention in moments of crisis (cf. a contrario Posner and Ver-
meule 2009). Moreover, bail-outs create the well-known problem of moral hazard. As 
far as the banks expect that in the worst case the state will come to rescue, they have no 
incentives to take the risk of bankruptcy seriously. The moral hazard created by bank 
bail-outs is regarded as violating the above-mentioned principle of liability (Haftung-
sprinzip), having adverse macro-economic consequences (see Funk 2009; Schäfer 
2009). It can hence be safely concluded that bank bailouts would not qualify as “con-
form state action” from an ordoliberal perspective. 
 
Financial regulation, corporate governance, and ordoliberalism 
 
After the bail-outs, the debate shifted to the causes of the banking crisis and how these 
should be addressed. The following distinguishes between three problems. First, the cri-
sis has shown the dangers of risky financial instruments, such as asset backed securities, 
collateral debt obligations, credit default swaps and other types of “structured products”. 
Banks could use innovative financial products in order to repackage loans and transfer 
the default risks to financial investors, while investors used credit default swaps to pro-
tect themselves from these risks. As a consequence, banks and investors became im-
mune against these risks, while creating unpredictable risks for financial markets as a 
whole (e.g., Crotty 2009; EU Commission 2012, 14). 
Second, the financial crisis has been a result of destructive incentives. The decisions 
by some bankers on granting loans and trading in securitised financial instruments are 
said to have exclusively focused on short-term gains due to the way in which their bo-
nus payments were structured (Kromphardt 2009). Moreover, banks themselves seemed 
indifferent towards defaults since, via securitisation, they transferred the default risks to 
the market, and as a consequence mainly cared about the number of loans, not the like-
lihood of repayments. 
Third, the crisis may be a result of insufficient tools to monitor financial markets and 
institutions at a global level. Although the crisis has been more severe in some countries 
than in others (see Konzelmann and Fovargue-Davies 2013), it is evident that the inter-
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connectedness of financial markets has contributed to its spread across borders. It is also 
not implausible to assume that the core players (banks, institutional investors etc) have 
engaged in forms of regulatory arbitrage, i.e. that they preferred to locate to legal sys-
tems with a “light-touch” approach to regulation. 
The ordoliberal response to the first problem of “originate and distribute”, i.e. selling 
loans on repackaged into new securities rather than keeping them on the balance sheet 
to maturity, is again based on the Haftungsprinzip. The types of financial instruments 
that contributed to the current crisis were not yet a topic for the original ordoliberals. 
Yet, commentators of recent events agree on the unease that ordoliberals would have 
felt. According to Richter (2011, 21-22) it is in markets for these instruments where the 
problem of liability arises most severely, and according to Sinn (2009; see also Sinn 
2011, 267) the problem was that:  
 
“(…) banks, hedge funds, special purpose vehicles, investment funds and real-
estate financers were allowed to conduct their business with only tiny amounts 
of equity capital. Without equity, there is no liability, and without liability, peo-
ple gamble. (…) Only strict regulations can create the confidence in the markets 
that capitalism needs to continue to increase the prosperity of the masses. Amer-
ica needs Walter Eucken, the father of ordoliberalism.” 
 
What tools precisely does ordoliberalism suggest? It would be against its liberal pre-
cepts to prohibit these financial instruments. Rather, a first step would be to make their 
risks more transparent, for instance, by improved operation of credit-rating agencies. 
Ordoliberalism would also recommend higher capital requirements, thus eliminating 
riskless lending in order to induce a more cautious approach to risk-taking (Sinn 2009). 
Thus, the ordoliberal position would refer to a more pronounced sensitiveness towards 
the “common good” and hence towards the negative externalities of individual organisa-
tions’ or actors’ behaviour for society at large (see below). In addition, law enforcement 
needs to be strengthened; in particular, financial supervisors may need to take a more 
pro-active role in monitoring the inherent risks of financial markets (Aßländer 2011, 37; 
Kromphardt 2009). Thus, an ordoliberal critique of the situation at the eve of the GFC 
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may well have stated that the state had become too weak to put effective checks on ever 
more volatile and speculative financial markets and ever larger banks. 
Ordoliberalism pre-dates the rise of modern forms of governance, such as public-
private networks of regulation. Such new forms of regulation do not sit easy with 
ordoliberal ideas: according to ordoliberals the state should not become a “weak state” 
unable to resist the influence of private interests groups (see, e.g., Bonefeld 2012, 640, 
642). Thus, while the ordoliberal preference for top-down regulation certainly has its 
disadvantages, it also reduces problems of accountability inherent in new forms of gov-
ernance (cf. Lodge and Stirton 2010). 
Turning to the second problem, “destructive incentives”, ordoliberalism recognises 
that individuals may act selfishly. This is not regarded as a problem as such. However, 
for ordoliberals selfishness can have a destructive effect on markets. In such cases, the 
law-maker has to intervene in order to align private incentives with the interests of the 
common good (Funk 2009). This notion of the “common good” suggests, among other 
things, that ordoliberalism would not support the idea that shareholder wealth creation is 
the only legitimate goal of corporations (including banks). Rather, societal goals can be 
legitimately imposed on economic actors by the state.  
It is regarding this concept of the “common good” that ordoliberalism has maintained 
a concern for the “social claims of the masses” first formulated at the Lippmann Collo-
quium, even leading to some suggestions that it should be called “left liberalism” or 
“social liberalism” (cf. its minutes, quoted in Foucault 2004, 158, fn. 15). By contrast, 
the post-war Chicago School rejected the notion of a society beyond the atomistic indi-
vidual: the incommensurability of individual tastes and preferences would not allow a 
principle to emerge that would unite society and any notion of a common interest is 
hence seen as fundamentally anti-liberal (Lagasnerie 2012). 
Possible ordoliberal solutions may be explicit restrictions or tax disincentives for 
forms of remuneration, which encourage short-termism. Thus, the compromise between 
the European Commission and the EU Parliament about a cap on banker bonuses in 
February 2013 – limiting the variable part of the salary to one annual salary and two an-
nual salaries in some cases –, while not directly the result of ordoliberal ideas, is largely 
in line with ordoliberal theory. It has also been contemplated that part of an ordoliberal 
response is to improve the monitoring power of shareholders (Grüner 2009). Yet, it is 
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not beyond doubt whether this is really consistent with an ordoliberal position because 
more shareholder power could also increase short-termism if that corresponds to the 
preference of shareholders. 
With respect to the third problem, international financial supervision, as other liber-
als, ordoliberals would not want to restrict the openness of financial markets. Yet, 
would they call for more international regulation? The original ordoliberal writings do 
not point in this direction. For instance, Eucken’s book on economic policy, written 
soon after the Second World War, only identifies the nation state, the scientific commu-
nity and the churches as the main forces to promote “order” (Eucken 1990, 325-350). 
Only a short section deals with the “problem of international order”. Here it is said that 
an international monetary order should facilitate cross-border trade. Eucken also refers 
to a possible need for “forms of international order” but without specifying details 
(Eucken 1952: 167-9; similarly Röpke 1959 quoted above). 
Today’s ordoliberals are more positive towards international regulation. For instance, 
there have been proposals for a “new neo-ordoliberalism as an economic ideal for an 
international system of competition regulations” (Conrad 2005: 27). It has also been 
suggested more generally that the globalisation of markets has to be accompanied by an 
international economic constitution (Aßländer 2011, 59), though this is hardly some-
thing original to ordoliberalism (see, e.g., EU Commission 2012, 6: since crisis global, 
international response needed). 
In practice, a number of current initiatives try to provide improved forms of regula-
tion and supervision of international financial institutions and markets, for example 
through the G20 summits, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision. Further initiatives for collaborative action can be found in the 
EU, for example, in establishing a European System of Financial Supervisors in 2011 
(as suggested by de Larosière 2009) and in the principal agreement for a Banking Union 
in December 2012. However, institutional arrangements based on voluntaristic agree-
ments among sovereign states also seem very difficult to establish and hence necessarily 
limited in scope (see already Röpke 1959 for similar scepticism). In the near future, it is 
therefore doubtful whether, outside of the EU, such arrangements can obtain an im-
portance similar to domestic legal frameworks in order to guarantee the ordoliberal aims 
of functioning economic order and individual liberty. 
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Responses to the Eurozone crisis 
 
In the latter stages of the GFC attention turned to the Eurozone crisis and possible re-
sponses, confirming or refuting ordoliberal ideas. A first feature often associated with 
ordoliberalism is that of “sticking to the rules” and accordingly a rejection of ad-hoc 
measures. Atkins (2011) suggests that ordoliberal ideas have strongly shaped the Ger-
man position in the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis:  
 
“Germany rebuilt its economy from the rubble of the second world war by set-
ting rules on how market forces should work – and sticking to them. Short-term 
intervention and discretionary government action were rejected. (…) That expe-
rience still informs the way the country’s mainstream economists approach poli-
cy making and a mere European financial crisis is not going to change their way 
of thinking. Germany continues to press hard for Greece, the region’s worst fis-
cal miscreant, to pay a high price for breaking the rules..(…)” 
 
The mere fact of having rules is not unique to ordoliberalism. But, similar to the afore-
mentioned question of bank bail-outs, it is again the Haftungsprinzip and the corre-
sponding problem of moral hazard that are typical for ordoliberal thinking. Thus, 
measures such as extensive funding of loans via the various stability mechanisms (ini-
tially the EFSF and EFSM, now the ESM), bond purchases by the ECB, and the sugges-
tion to turn the ECB into lender of last resort are not in line with ordoliberal principles 
(e.g., Berghahn and Young 2012, 9; Luckhurst 2012, 746). 
Of course, in practice most of the Eurozone countries did not comply with the stabil-
ity rules, and accession to the Eurozone took a “liberal” approach in applying the con-
vergence criteria. Moreover, as the Eurozone crisis worsened, the need for measures 
such as emergency loans and ECB bond buybacks was seen as a necessity in order to 
prevent contagion of the Greek sovereign debt crisis to other Eurozone countries. This 
experience raises doubts about whether a rigid ordoliberalism can help to address severe 
financial crises: as Sinn (2011, 267) – in principle, a supporter of ordoliberalism –
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expresses it, “ordoliberal recipes [may] serve to protect the jungle from an outbreak of 
fire”, but they may be “less effective in putting out fires that have already been ignited”. 
Secondly, the Eurozone crisis has exposed a split in priorities. On the one hand, there 
are countries such as Germany whose main focus is on fiscal discipline and price stabil-
ity, including a limit to the size of sovereign debt (Schuldenbremse or “debt-brake”). On 
the other hand, there is the position that economic growth should be the main priority. 
Such a pro-growth agenda is pursued by some governments of the political left (e.g., 
Hollande in France) and it is also apparent in the opposition to austerity measures in 
Greece, Italy and Spain. 
Dullien and Guérot (2012) associate the German position with “the long shadow of 
ordoliberalism”. To some extent, such reasoning is plausible. While some ordoliberal 
ideas are close to social-democratic policies (see the previous section), ordoliberalism is 
against short-term Keynesian responses to economic downturns. Ordoliberals were also 
keen on emphasising that a stable currency is necessary and some, such as Leonhard 
Miksch, even suggested that countries should return to a gold standard with fixed ex-
change rates (see Blum 1969, 79-82). 
However, fully equating the German position in the crisis with ordoliberalism is 
problematic. Assuming a realist position, it is clear that the German government often 
acts in its national self-interest, for example, in being interested in the success of the 
German export industry (cf. Young and Semmler 2011) and in appealing to the German 
electorate (cf. Featherstone 2011, 201). For instance, the European Fiscal Compact, in 
force since January 2013, was politically important for Germany but it is not officially 
part of EU law (due to the UK’s “veto”). As Joerges (2013, 15) explains more general-
ly: 
 
“(T)his type of regime cannot be enforced by conventional legal techniques. It 
requires a managerial supervisor with discretionary powers who can try to con-
trol the unruly interdependencies which we are witnessing and to which we are 
exposed. This type of arrangement has nothing in common with the ordo-liberal 
vision of an economic constitution. What we see emerging is a new mode, a de-
legalized economic constitution.” 
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Moreover, the use or non-use of Keynesian tools for economic growth too is not only, 
or even mainly, the result of ordoliberalism. Whether a “Keynesian revival” does or 
does not happen in practice is often a mere result of politics: for example, the narrow 
UK elections of 2010 meant that the UK is now in the “austerity camp” but the result 
could easily have been a different one; and in the EU the complex power relations be-
tween the national and European institutions are of crucial importance for economic 
policies (cf. Luckhurst 2012, 760, 766). Finally, rejection of Keynesian instruments is 
not a unique feature of ordoliberalism: indeed, the initial ordoliberal writings precede 
the publication of Keynes’s General Theory from 1936 by a few years (e.g., Eucken 
1932; Röpke 1923), and many subsequent ones do not show a great deal of interest in 
the advantages and disadvantages of demand-side economics either. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
“Crises, famously, are turning points” (Froud et al. 2012, 44). Yet, change may still be 
difficult since in times of crisis in particular regulation faces many challenges of coor-
dination and power imbalances (see, e.g., Gieve and Provost 2012; Crouch 2011; 
Engelen et al. 2011). But, re-considering the statements by Wagenknecht and Ferguson, 
the attraction of ordoliberalism seems to be that it could be a compromise between dif-
ferent political camps. Such optimism may also be supported by its history since 
ordoliberals contributed to the re-establishment of a social market economy in post-WW 
II Germany, without following the more radical path of the Chicago School. 
However, Ferguson and Wagenknecht also have in common that they both misunder-
stand the complexity of ordoliberal ideas. Like certain strands of regulation studies, they 
mainly look at regulatory regimes in quantitative terms. Thus, what seems to matter is 
the “amount” of state, for instance, discussing apparent trends such as the “downsizing” 
of the government, and the “rolling back” of the state. Yet, quantity of laws and regula-
tion of state intervention is not what matters to ordoliberals. For ordoliberals it is clear 
that achieving their desired state of economic order may require as much regulation as a 
socialist planned economy. This is not seen as a problem: rather, what is decisive is the 
nature and substance of such regulations. Ordoliberalism reminds us hence that liberal-
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ism does not necessarily have to mean absence or even “minimization” of state inter-
vention in the economy. 
Thus, this paper has argued that the main contribution that ordoliberalism can make 
both to the analysis of the crisis and to possible ways out of it has to do with its more 
fine-grained understanding of regulation. We have investigated what exactly ordoliber-
als mean by regulation. We have also discussed that taking this approach allows us to 
rebuke rhetorical shortcuts that equate everything coming out of Germany with ordolib-
eralism or use the term merely to claim more space for state intervention in general.  
Our analysis of the GFC and its ordoliberal interpretation shows that ordoliberalism 
does not constitute a panacea, but that it can provide some important lessons. If we ac-
cept that one of the main problems of the financial system on the eve of the GFC was 
the lack of financial market supervision, ordoliberalism’s key focus on a strong and in-
terventionist state constitutes an important element that could have put a halt to the 
bubble before it busted. Other elements of an ordoliberal state too may have had a posi-
tive effect on financial stability in the run-up to the crisis: it would have called for more 
transparency, clearer links between risks and responsibilities and, possibly, other forms 
of regulation concerning the risk-free use of innovative financial instruments and the 
problem of destructive incentives in financial markets.  
At the same time, ordoliberalism is opposed to discretionary interventionist 
measures. Such direct intervention on market forces – rather than on the framework for 
competition – would not be a market-conforming type of state intervention. Thus, bail-
ing out banks or sovereign states is not part of the ordoliberal agenda: rather, ordoliberal 
regulation focuses on ex-ante conditions, in particular, but not only, as regards the prob-
lem of organisations that may become “too big to fail”. Having said that, it can also be 
seen that the ordoliberal rejection of ex-post support for banks and sovereign states has 
been strongly challenged in the context of the GFC. Thus, again both Wagenknecht and 
Ferguson get it wrong when they seem to suggest that ordoliberalism is always a rela-
tively uncontroversial middle way.  
Ordoliberalism also hints at the limitations of mainstream economic methods. It is 
frequently suggested that recent events can be interpreted as a failure of mainstream 
economic methods (e.g., Hodgson 2011; Lawson 2009). Ordoliberalism is more discur-
sive and less technical than the current mainstream and it remains more sceptical of a 
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radical methodological individualism. As it is also a joined endeavour of economists, 
lawyers, sociologists and political scientists, it provides an example of an interdiscipli-
nary approach to economic phenomena. This also impacts on the way economic regula-
tion is understood: while mainstream economics may often regard regulation as a mere 
cost factor, ordoliberalism recognises its socio-economic embeddedness, similar to 
modern approaches of regulation (see, e.g., Baldwin et al. 2010). 
Beyond the current crisis, the analysis of the ordoliberal theory of regulation pro-
vides us with insights that help solving the “freer markets, more rules” puzzle often re-
ferred to in the regulation studies area. From an ordoliberal theory of regulation, this 
empirical phenomenon does not seem paradoxical as long as the regulation in question 
is market conforming. The regulatory infrastructure of the market order has always been 
an integral part of ordoliberalism. Braithwaite (2005, 10) quotes Friedman’s statement 
according to which he realised from the experience of the 1990s that the “rule of law” 
was probably more fundamental to a liberal economy than privatisation. Braithwaite 
takes this return to the institutional underpinnings of the liberal market order as a sign of 
the end of neo-liberalism. But we would suggest that it could equally well be interpreted 
as the return to its foundations as they were first formulated during the Lippmann Col-
loquium in 1938 and kept alive in the ordoliberal principles discussed in this paper. 
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Notes 
 
                                                 
1
 For a more extensive descriptive treatment of ordoliberalism and related approaches 
see Schnyder and Siems 2013. 
2
 In addition, but beyond the scope of this paper, new forms of liberalism also emerged 
elsewhere in Europe: see, e.g., Forte and Marchionatti 2012 (for a good discussion of 
the work by Luigi Einaudi); Ban 2011 (for neoliberal ideas in Spain and Romania). 
3
 Note that Miksch specifically referred to monetary policy, while other ordoliberals 
were more sceptical about an active monetary policy (see Bibow 2009: 174). 
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